Ensuring High-Quality Randomness in Cryptographic Key Generation by Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
9.
73
66
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  8
 Ja
n 2
01
4
Ensuring High-Quality Randomness
in Cryptographic Key Generation
(Extended version)∗
Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
Stanford University
henrycg@stanford.edu
Wendy Mu
Stanford University
wmu@cs.stanford.edu
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
dabo@cs.stanford.edu
Bryan Ford
Yale University
bryan.ford@yale.edu
ABSTRACT
The security of any cryptosystem relies on the secrecy of the
system’s secret keys. Yet, recent experimental work demon-
strates that tens of thousands of devices on the Internet use
RSA and DSA secrets drawn from a small pool of candidate
values. As a result, an adversary can derive the device’s
secret keys without breaking the underlying cryptosystem.
We introduce a new threat model, under which there is a
systemic solution to such randomness flaws. In our model,
when a device generates a cryptographic key, it incorporates
some random values from an entropy authority into its cryp-
tographic secrets and then proves to the authority, using
zero-knowledge-proof techniques, that it performed this op-
eration correctly. By presenting an entropy-authority-signed
public-key certificate to a third party (like a certificate au-
thority or SSH client), the device can demonstrate that its
public key incorporates randomness from the authority and
is therefore drawn from a large pool of candidate values.
Where possible, our protocol protects against eavesdroppers,
entropy authority misbehavior, and devices attempting to
discredit the entropy authority. To demonstrate the prac-
ticality of our protocol, we have implemented and evalu-
ated its performance on a commodity wireless home router.
When running on a home router, our protocol incurs a 2.1×
slowdown over conventional RSA key generation and it in-
curs a 4.4× slowdown over conventional EC-DSA key gen-
eration.
1. INTRODUCTION
A good source of randomness is crucial for a number of
cryptographic operations. Public-key encryption schemes
∗This is an extended and corrected version of a paper which
appeared in the proceedings of the 2013 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS). The pro-
ceedings version contained an error in the DSA protocol and
accompanying security proof. This version corrects that er-
ror and contains evaluation results for the revised protocol.
To ensure that the our RSA and DSA evaluations reflect
similar network conditions, we reran the network experi-
ments whose results we summarize in Table 1 and Figure 5.
The cross-country round-trip network latency has increased
to 100 ms from 80 ms since we ran the experiments for the
proceedings version of the paper.
This version also contains the full proof of security for the
RSA protocol.
use randomness to achieve chosen-plaintext security, key-
exchange algorithms use randomness to establish secret ses-
sion keys, and commitment schemes use randomness to hide
the committed value. The security of these schemes relies on
the unpredictability of the random input values, so when the
“random” inputs are not really random, dire security failures
result [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 30, 33, 36, 45].
Although the dangers of weak randomness have been part
of the computer security folklore for years [30], entropy fail-
ures are still commonplace. In 2008, a single mistaken patch
caused the OpenSSL distribution in all Debian-based oper-
ating systems to use only the process ID (plus a few other
easy-to-guess values) as the seed for its pseudo-random num-
ber generator. This bug caused affected machines to select a
1024-bit RSA modulus from a pool of fewer than one million
values, rather than the near-21000 possible values [45]. By
replaying the key generation process using each of the one
million possible PRNG seeds, an adversary could recover the
secret key corresponding to one of these weak public keys in
a matter or hours or days.
Recent surveys [33, 36] of SSH and TLS public keys on
the Internet demonstrate that hardware devices with poorly
seeded random number generators have led to a prolifer-
ation of weak cryptographic keys. During the drafting of
this paper, NetBSD maintainers discovered a bug caused by
a “misplaced parenthesis” that could have caused NetBSD
machines to generate cryptographic keys incorporating as
few as 32 or 64 bits of entropy, instead of the 100+ ex-
pected bits [40]. Even more recently, a PRNG initialization
bug in the Android operating system could have caused ap-
plications using the system to generate weak cryptographic
keys [35].
Randomness failures continue to haunt cryptographic soft-
ware for a number of reasons: the randomness “stack” in a
modern operating system [43] is large and complex, there is
no simple way to test whether a random number generator
is really generating random numbers, and (at least in the
context of cryptographic keys) there has never been a sys-
temic solution to the randomness problem. The response to
entropy failures has traditionally been ad hoc: each device
manufacturer or software vendor patches RNG-related bugs
in its own implementation (once discovered), without de-
ploying techniques to prevent similar failures in the future.
The quantity and severity of randomness failures suggests
that this “fix the implementation” approach is grossly insuf-
ficient.
We offer the first systemic solution to the entropy problem
in cryptographic key generation for public-key cryptosys-
tems. In our protocol, a device generating a cryptographic
keypair fetches random values from an entropy authority
and incorporates these values into its cryptographic secrets.
The device can later prove to third parties (e.g., a certifi-
cate authority or an SSH client) that the device’s secrets
incorporate the authority’s random values, thus guarantee-
ing that the device’s cryptographic keys are selected from
a large enough pool of candidate values. Unlike certificate
authorities in today’s Internet, our entropy authorities are
not trusted third parties: if the device has a strong entropy
source, a malicious entropy authority learns no useful infor-
mation about the device’s secret key. We present versions of
our protocol for RSA and DSA key generation and we offer
proofs of security for each.
A subtlety of our solution is the threat model: under a
traditional “global passive adversary” model, the adversary
can completely simulate the view of a device that has a very
weak entropy source. Thus, under the global passive adver-
sary model, a device with a weak entropy source has no hope
of generating strong keys. We propose an alternate threat
model, in which the adversary can observe all communica-
tion except for one initial communication session between
the device and the entropy authority. Under this more lim-
ited adversary model, which is realistic in many deployment
scenarios, we can take advantage of an entropy authority to
ensure the randomness of cryptographic keys.
The key generation protocols we present are useful both
for devices with strong and weak entropy sources. In par-
ticular, if the device has a strong entropy source (the device
can repeatedly sample from the uniform distribution over a
large set of values), running the protocol never weakens the
device’s cryptographic keys. In contrast, if the device has
a weak or biased entropy source, running the protocol can
dramatically strengthen the device’s keys by ensuring that
its keys incorporate sufficient randomness. The device need
not know whether it has a strong or weak entropy source:
the same protocol is used in both cases.
A recent survey of public keys [33] suggests that embedded
devices are responsible for generating the majority of weak
cryptographic keys on the Internet. To demonstrate that our
protocols are practical even on this type of computationally
limited network device, we have evaluated the protocols on
a $70 Linksys home router running the dd-wrt [26] operat-
ing system. Our RSA key generation protocol incurs a 2.1×
slowdown on the Linksys router when generating a 2048-bit
key, and our RSA and DSA protocols incur no more than
2 seconds of slowdown on a laptop and a workstation. The
DSA version of our protocol is compatible with both the
elliptic-curve and finite-fields DSA variants. Our protocols
generate standard RSA and DSA keys which are, for a given
bit-length, as secure as their conventionally generated coun-
terparts.
In prior work, Juels and Guajardo [34] present a proto-
col in which a possibly malicious device generates an RSA
key in cooperation with a certificate authority. Their proto-
col prevents a device from generating an ill-formed keypair
(e.g., an RSA modulus that is the product of more than two
primes). We consider a different threat model. We ensure
that a device samples its keys from a distribution with high
min-entropy, but we do not prevent the device from gen-
erating malformed keys. Under this new threat model, we
achieve roughly a 25× performance improvement over the
protocol of Juels and Guajardo (as measured by the number
of modular exponentiations that the device must compute).
Section 7 compares the two protocols and discusses other
related work.
After introducing our threat model in Section 2, we de-
scribe our key generation protocols in Section 3 and present
security proofs in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our eval-
uation results and Section 6 discusses issues related to inte-
grating our protocols with existing systems.
1.1 Why Other Solutions Are Insufficient
Before describing our protocol in detail, we discuss a few
other possible, but unsatisfactory, ways to prevent networked
devices from using weak cryptographic keys.1
Possible Solution #1: Fix the implementation. One
possible solution to the weak key problem is to simply make
sure that cryptography libraries properly incorporate ran-
dom values into the cryptographic secrets that they produce.
Unfortunately, bugs and bad implementations are a fact of
life in the world of software, and the subtleties of random
number generation make randomness bugs particularly com-
mon. Implementations that seed their random number gen-
erators with public or guessable values (e.g., time, process
ID, or MAC address) [12, 19, 20, 22, 22], implementations
that use weak random number generators [14, 15, 16, 24,
25], and implementations without a good source of environ-
mental entropy [33] are all vulnerable.
The complexity of generating cryptographically strong ran-
dom numbers, the overwhelming number of randomness fail-
ures in deployed software, and the difficulty of detecting
these failures during testing all indicate that “fix the imple-
mentation” is an insufficient solution to the weak key prob-
lem. Given that some implementations will be buggy, there
should be a way to assure clients that their TLS and SSH
servers are using strong keys, even if the client suspects that
the servers do not have access to a good source of random
values.
Possible Solution #2: Simple entropy server. A sec-
ond possible solution would be to have devices fetch some
random values from an“entropy sever”and incorporate these
values (along with some random values that the device picks)
into the device’s cryptographic secrets. As long as the ad-
versary cannot observe the device’s communication with the
server, the server would provide an effective source of envi-
ronmental entropy.
One problem with this approach comes in attributing blame
for failures. If a device using an entropy server produces
weak keys, the device might blame the entropy server for
providing it with weak random values. In turn, the entropy
server could claim that it provided the device with strong
random values but that the device failed to incorporate them
into the device’s cryptographic secrets. Without some addi-
tional protocol, a third party will not be able to definitively
attribute the randomness failure to either the device or the
entropy server.
1By weak keys we mean keys sampled from a distribution
with much less min-entropy than the user expects. For ex-
ample, a 224-bit EC-DSA key sampled from a distribution
with only 20 bits of min-entropy is weak.
Figure 1: Overview of the protocol participants. (1)
The device fetches random values from the entropy
authority, proves to the authority that its key in-
corporates these values, and obtains a signature on
the key from the EA. (2) The device submits its
EA-signed public key to the certificate authority for
signing. (3) The device presents an EA-signed key
to a connecting client to prove that its keypair in-
corporates entropy from the authority.
Possible Solution #3: Key database. A third possi-
ble technique to prevent devices from using weak keys would
be to deploy a “key database” that contains a copy of every
public key on the Internet. A non-profit organization could
run this database, much as the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion maintains the SSL Observatory [27], a static database
of public keys on the Internet.
Whenever a device with a potentially weak entropy source
generates a new keypair, the device would send its new pub-
lic key to the key database. If the database already contains
that key (or if the database contains an RSA modulus that
shares a factor with the new key), the device would gener-
ate a fresh key and submit it to the database. The device
would continue this generate-and-submit process until find-
ing a unique key. At the end of the process, the device would
be guaranteed to have a key that is unique, at least amongst
the set of keys in the database.
Unfortunately, this proposed solution would obscure the
entropy problem without fixing it. An attacker could replay
the entire key generation process using the known initial
state of a device with a weak entropy source to learn the
secret keys of that device. By creating a centralized database
of (possibly weak) keys, such a solution would make it easier
for attackers to find and compromise weak keys.
2. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our proposed solution to the weak key problem, pictori-
ally represented in Figure 1, takes place between a device, an
entropy authority, a certificate authority2 (optionally), and
a client. We describe the roles of each of these participants
before outlining our threat model and the security properties
of the scheme.
2.1 Participants
Device. The device is the entity generating the RSA or
DSA keypair that we want to ensure is sufficiently random,
even if the device does not have access to a strong internal
entropy source. The device might be an embedded device
(e.g., a commodity wireless home router), or it might be a
full-fledged server. The device could use the keypair it gen-
erates to secure HTTPS sessions and to authenticate itself
in SSH sessions.
2IETF documents [7] use the term certification authority but
we will follow common usage and use certificate authority.
Entropy authority (EA). The entropy authority is the
participant responsible for ensuring that a device’s keypair is
selected with enough randomness (is sampled independently
from a distribution with high enough min-entropy). Just
as a certificate authority verifies the identifying information
(name, address, etc.) on a user’s public key, the entropy
authority verifies the randomness of a user’s public key.
As the device generates its cryptographic keypair, it fetches
some random values from the entropy authority and then
proves to the entropy authority that it has incorporated
these values into its keypair. The entropy verifies this proof
and then signs the device’s public key. In practice, an en-
tropy authority is just a public Web service with which the
device interacts when the device first generates its keypair.
We assume that the entropy authority has a strong entropy
source, but that the entropy authority might be malicious.
We imagine a future in which there are a large number
of public entropy authorities on the Internet, run by corpo-
rate IT departments, certificate authorities, universities, and
other large organizations. A device would select its entropy
authority much as users select certificate authorities today:
based on reputation and reliability. To defend against the
failure (or maliciousness) of a single entropy authority, the
device could interact with a number of entropy authorities
to generate a single key, as we describe in Section 6.
Certificate authority (CA). The certificate authority
plays the role of a conventional CA: the certificate authority
confirms that the real-world identity of the device matches
the identity listed in device’s certificate, after which the CA
signs the device’s certificate. In our model, CAs will only
sign certificates that have been signed first by an entropy
authority. In this way, CAs are guaranteed to sign only
public keys that are drawn from a distribution with high
min-entropy. Since many certificates (particularly in em-
bedded devices) are self-signed, the CA is an optional entity
in our protocol.
Client. The client is anyone who connects to the de-
vice. In our model, the client can ensure that the device has
a sufficiently random public key by verifying the entropy
authority’s signature on the key. Every client keeps a sig-
nature verification key for each entropy authority it trusts,
just as today’s Web browsers maintain a list of public keys
for trusted root CAs.
2.2 Threat Model
Throughout the paper, we say that a participant is honest
if it performs the protocol correctly and is dishonest oth-
erwise. A device has a strong entropy source if it can re-
peatedly sample from the uniform distribution over some
set (e.g., {0, 1}). We say that the device has a weak entropy
source otherwise. A strong key, for our purposes, is a key
independently sampled from a distribution over the set of
possible keys that has at least k − polylog(k) bits of min-
entropy, where k is the security parameter. In other words,
a device generates strong keys if the probability that the
device will generate a particular public key pk is at most
2−(k−polylog(k)) for all public keys pk. A weak key is any key
that is not strong.
We use min-entropy as our metric for randomness because
min-entropy gives an upper bound on the adversary’s ability
to guess samples from the distribution. If a distribution has
k bits of min-entropy, then the adversary will be able to cor-
rectly guess the value of a sample from the distribution with
probability at most 2−k. Additionally, the min-entropy of
the distribution gives an upper bound on the collision proba-
bility of the distribution—the probability that two indepen-
dent samples from the distribution are equal. Therefore, if
a key generation protocol outputs public keys sampled from
a distribution with min-entropy k, two devices generating
keys using the protocol will have a negligible chance (in k)
of generating the same public key or of generating RSA keys
which share a prime factor.
The goal of our protocol is to have the device interact
with the entropy authority in such a way that, after the in-
teraction, the device holds a strong cryptographic key. This
overall goal must be tempered a few realities. In particular,
if a device has a no entropy source (or a very weak entropy
source), then a global eavesdropper can always learn the de-
vice’s secret key.
To see why this is so, consider that a device with no en-
tropy source is just a deterministic process. Thus, the eaves-
dropper could always replay such a device’s interaction with
the entropy authority using the messages collected while
eavesdropping. Thus, there is no hope for a completely
deterministic device to generate keys that a global eaves-
dropper cannot guess.
To circumvent this fundamental problem, we consider in-
stead a two-phase threat model:
1. Set-up phase: In the set-up phase, the device interacts
with the entropy authority in a communication ses-
sion that the adversary cannot observe or modify.
In our key-generation protocols, this set-up communi-
cation session consists of two round-trip interactions
between the device and the entropy authority.
2. Long-term communication phase: After the set-up stage
ends, the adversary can observe and tamper with the
traffic on all network links.
This threat model mimics SSH’s implicit threat model: an
SSH client gets one “free” interaction with the SSH server,
in which the SSH server sends its public key to the client.
As long as the adversary cannot tamper with this initial
interaction, SSH protects against eavesdropping and man-
in-the-middle attacks.
Under the adversary model outlined above, our key gen-
eration protocol provides the following security properties:
Protects device from a malicious EA. If the device has
a strong entropy source, then the entropy authority learns
no useful information about the device’s secrets during a
run of the protocol. We prove this property for the RSA
protocol by demonstrating that the entropy authority can
simulate its interaction with the device given only O(log k)
bits of information about the RSA primes p and q. We prove
this property for the DSA protocol by demonstrating that
the entropy authority can perfectly simulate its interaction
with the device given no extra information.
Protects device from CA and client. An honest device
interacting with an honest entropy authority holds a strong
key at the end of a protocol run, even if the device has a
weak entropy source. When the device later interacts with
a certificate authority (to obtain a public-key certificate) or
with a client (to establish a TLS session), the device will
send these parties a strong public key, even if the device has
weak entropy source.
Protects EA from malicious device. If the entropy
authority is honest, then the keys generated by this protocol
will be strong, even if the device is dishonest. Intuitively,
this property states that a faulty device cannot discard the
random values that the entropy authority contributes to the
key generation process.
A consequence of this security property is that a malicious
device can never “discredit” an entropy authority by tricking
the entropy authority into signing a key sampled from a low-
entropy distribution. If a device does try to have the entropy
authority sign a key sampled from a distribution with low
min-entropy (a weak key), the authority will detect that the
device misbehaved and will refuse to sign the key.
A nuance of this property is that the entropy authority will
accept public keys that are invalid, as long as the keys are
sampled independently from a distribution with high min-
entropy. In essence, a faulty device in our protocol can create
keys that are incorrect but random. For example, the device
could pick an composite number as one of its RSA“primes,”
or it could use any number of other methods to “shoot it-
self in the foot” during the key generation process. Since
the device can always compromise its own keypair (e.g., by
publishing its secret key), we do not attempt to protect a
completely malicious device from itself. Instead, we simply
guarantee that any key that the entropy authority accepts
will be drawn independently from a distribution with high
min-entropy.
2.3 Non-threats
Our protocol addresses the threat posed by devices that
use weak entropy sources to generate their cryptographic
keys. We explicitly do not address these other broad vulner-
ability classes:
• Adversarial devices. If the device is completely ad-
versarial, then the device can easily compromise its
own security (e.g., by publishing its own secret key).
Ensuring that such an adversarial device has high-
entropy cryptographic keys is not useful, since no con-
nection to such an adversarial device is secure.
• Faulty cryptography library (or OS). Our proto-
col does not attempt to protect against cryptographic
software that is arbitrarily incorrect. Incorrect soft-
ware can introduce any number of odd vulnerabilities
(e.g., a timing channel that leaks the secret key), which
we place out of scope.
• Denial of service. We do not address denial-of-
service attacks by the entropy authority or certificate
authority. In a real-world deployment, we expect that
a device facing a denial-of-service attack by a CA or
entropy authority could simply switch to using a new
CA or EA.
3. PROTOCOL
This section describes a number of standard cryptographic
primitives we require and then outlines our RSA and DSA
key generation protocols.
3.1 Preliminaries
Our key generation protocols use the following crypto-
graphic primitives.
Additively homomorphic commitments. We require
an additively homomorphic and perfectly hiding commit-
ment scheme. Given a commitment to x and a commitment
to x′, anyone should be able to construct a commitment to
x+x′ (mod Q) without knowing the values x or x′. Our im-
plementation uses Pedersen commitments [41]. Given public
generators g, h of a group G with prime order Q, and a ran-
dom value r ∈ ZQ, a Pedersen commitment to the value x is
Commit(x; r) = gxhr.3 To ensure that the commitments are
binding, participants must select the generators g and h in
such a way that no one knows the discrete logarithm logg h.
The commitment scheme is additively homomorphic be-
cause the product of two commitments reveals a commit-
ment to x+ x′ (mod Q) with randomness r + r′ (mod Q):
Commit(x+ x′; r + r′) = Commit(x; r)Commit(x′; r)
We abbreviate Commit(x; r) as Commit(x) when the ran-
domness used in the commitment is not relevant to the ex-
position.
Of course, if the device has a weak entropy source the de-
vice will not be able to generate a strong random value r
for use in the commitments. We use randomized commit-
ments to hide a device’s secrets in case the device does have
a strong entropy source. Since a device does not necessar-
ily know whether its randomness source is strong or weak,
we must use the same constructions for devices with both
strong and weak entropy sources.
Public-key signature scheme. We use a standard
public-key signature scheme that is existentially unforge-
able [31]. We denote the signing and verification algorithms
by Sign and Verify.
Multiplication proof for committed values. We use
a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocol that proves
that the product of two committed values is equal to some
third value. For example, given commitments Cx and Cy
to values x, y ∈ ZQ, and a third product value z ∈ ZQ, the
proof demonstrates that z = xy (mod Q). We denote the
prover and verifier algorithms by π ← MulProve(z, Cx, Cy)
and MulVer(π, z, Cx, Cy).
We implement this proof using the method of Cramer and
Damg˚ard [10]. Written in Camenisch and Stadler’s zero-
knowledge proof notation [6], the multiplication proof proves
the statement:
PoK{x, y, rx, ry, rz :
Cx = g
xhrx ∧ Cy = gyhry ∧ gzhrz = (Cx)yhrz}
Application of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] converts this in-
teractive zero-knowledge proof protocol into a non-interactive
proof in the random-oracle model [2]. When implemented
using a hash function that outputs length-l binary strings,
the non-interactive multiplication proof is l+3⌈log2Q⌉ bits
long.
Proof of knowledge for Pedersen commitments. We
use a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge pro-
tocol that proves that a committed value is equal to the
3 We denote the group order with capital “Q” to distinguish
it from the RSA prime q in n = pq that we use later on.
discrete logarithm of a second group element. Given a Ped-
ersen commitment Cx = g
xhr, a DSA public key A, and an
auxiliary value x′, the proof demonstrates that:
PoK{x, r : Cx = gxhr ∧ (A/gx
′
) = gx}
We denote the prover and verifier algorithms by π ← PedProve(
x, r,Cx, x
′, A) and PedVer(π,Cx, x
′, A).
We implement this proof using the method of Camenisch
and Stadler [6] and we apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28]
to convert the interactive proof into a non-interactive proof
in the random-oracle model [2]. When implemented using a
hash function that outputs length-l binary strings, the non-
interactive proof is l + 2⌈log2Q⌉ bits long.
Common Public Keys. We assume that all participants
hold a signature verification public-key for the entropy and
certificate authorities.
3.2 RSA Key Generation
The RSA key generation protocol takes place between the
device and the entropy authority. At the end of a successful
run of the protocol, the device holds an RSA public modulus
n that is independently sampled from a distribution over Z
that has high min-entropy and the device also holds the
entropy authority’s signature σ on this modulus.
In Section 4.1 we prove that the RSA protocol satisfies
the security properties defined in Section 2.2. In Section 6,
we describe how a device could use this protocol to gener-
ate a self-signed X.509 certificate and how to integrate this
protocol with today’s certificate authority infrastructure.
Parameters. Before the protocol begins, the device and
entropy authority must agree on a set of common system pa-
rameters. These parameters include the security parameter
k, which determines the bit-length of the RSA primes p and
q. For a given value of k, the participants must also agree on
a prime-order group G used for the Pedersen commitments
and zero-knowledge proofs. The prime order Q of the group
G must be somewhat larger than the largest RSA modu-
lus n generated by the protocol, so the participants should
let Q ≈ 22k+100. In addition, participants must agree on
two generators g and h of the group G, such that no one
knows the discrete logarithm logg h. In an implementation
of the protocol, participants could generate g and h using a
shared public hash function. Finally, they also agree on a
small number ∆ (e.g., ∆ = 216) discussed in Section 3.2.1
below.
Since the parameters contain only public values, all de-
vices and entropy authorities could share one set of param-
eters (per key size).
Protocol Description. Figure 2 presents our RSA key
generation protocol. To generate an RSA key, the device
first selects k-bit integers x and y and sends randomized
commitments to these values to the entropy authority. The
entropy authority then selects k-bit integers x′ and y′ at
random and returns these values to the device.
After confirming that x′ and y′ are of the correct length,
the device searches for offsets δx and δy such that the sums
p = x + x′ + δx and q = y + y
′ + δy are suitable RSA
primes. That is, p and q must be distinct primes such that
gcd(p − 1, e) = 1 and gcd(q − 1, e) = 1, where e is the
RSA encryption exponent. The device then sets n ← pq,
Device Entropy Authority
Step 1
choose x, y
R←− [2k, 2k+1)
Cx ← Commit(x)
Cy ← Commit(y)
send Cx, Cy
✲ Step 2
choose x′, y′
R←− [2k, 2k+1)
send x′, y′
✛Step 3
abort if x′, y′ 6∈ [2k, 2k+1)
choose 0 ≤ δx, δy < ∆ s.t.
p← x+ x′ + δx
q ← y + y′ + δy
are distinct primes,
gcd(p− 1, e) = 1, and
gcd(q − 1, e) = 1
abort if no such δx, δy exist
let n← pq
Cp ← Cxgx′+δx
Cq ← Cygy′+δy
π ← MulProve(n,Cp, Cq)
send n, δx, δy , π
✲ Step 4
Cp ← Cxgx′+δx
Cq ← Cygy′+δy
abort if δx, δy /∈ [0,∆) or
n /∈ [22k+2, 22k+4) or
MulVer(π, n,Cp, Cq) 6= 1
σ ← SignEA(n)
send σ
✛Step 5
abort if
VerifyEA(σ, n) 6= 1
public key is 〈n, e, σ〉
Figure 2: RSA Key Generation Protocol
generates commitments to p and q, and produces a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π that the
product of the committed values is equal to n. The device
sends n, δx, δy, and the the proof π to the entropy authority.
The validity of the proof π and the fact that the δ val-
ues are less than ∆ convince the entropy authority that the
device’s RSA primes p and q incorporate the authority’s ran-
dom values x′ and y′. At this point, the authority signs the
modulus n and returns it to the device.
3.2.1 Finding Primes p and q
To maintain the security of the protocol, it is important
that the δ values chosen in Step 3 are relatively small—
if the device could pick an arbitrarily large δx value, for
example, the device could set δx ← −x′, which would make
p = x + x′ − x′ = x, thereby cancelling out the effect of
the random value x′ contributed by the entropy authority.
To prevent the device from “throwing away” the entropy
authority’s entropy in this way, we require that the δ values
be less than some maximum value ∆, which depends on the
security parameter k.
Picking the size of ∆ requires some care: if ∆ is too small,
then there may be no suitable prime p in the range [x+x′, x+
x′ +∆), and the device will have to run the protocol many
times before it finds suitable primes p and q. The value ∆
should be large enough that the protocol will succeed with
overwhelming probability, but not so large that the device
can pick n = pq arbitrarily.
Following Juels and Guajardo [34], if the density of primes
is dprime and the density of these special primes (with gcd(p−
1, q−1, e) = 1) is dspecial, we conjecture that dspecial/dprime =
(e− 1)/e, where e is the RSA encryption exponent (a small
odd prime constant). Under this conjecture and the Hardy-
Littlewood [32] conjecture, Juels and Guajardo demonstrate
that the probability that there is no suitable prime in the
interval [x + x′, x + x′ + ∆) is at most exp(−λ) when ∆ =
λ ln(x+ x′)( e
e−1
) as (x+ x′)→∞. To make this conjecture
concrete: if we take (x + x′) ≈ 21024 , the RSA encryption
exponent e = 65537, and require a failure probability of at
most 2−80, then we should set ∆ ≈ 216. In the very unlikely
case that the device fails to find primes p and q in the right
range, the device aborts and re-runs the protocol from the
beginning.
3.2.2 Eliminating Information Leakage
The values δx and δy sent to the entropy authority in
Step 3 of the protocol leak some information about p and q
to the entropy authority. In particular, the authority learns
that the prime gap before p (resp. q) has a width of at least
δx (resp. δy). We argue in Section 4.1 the entropy authority
cannot use this leakage to help it factor the modulus n.
Even so, it is possible to modify the protocol to completely
eliminate this information leakage at some performance cost.
One way to modify the protocol is to require that δx = δy =
0 in Step 3 of the protocol. If the values x + x′ and y + y′
are not prime, the device aborts the protocol and restarts
it from the beginning. Since the probability that a random
k-bit number is a suitable prime is near 1/k for large k, the
device will have to run the protocol approximately k2 times
before it succeeds.
To reduce the number of communication rounds required
for this revised protocol, the device could run the k2 protocol
iterations in parallel. The device would send k2-length vec-
tors of commitments to random values ~x, ~y in Step 1 of the
protocol and the entropy authority would return two vec-
tors ~x′, ~y′ in Step 2 of the protocol, with each vector having
length k2. The device would then iterate over the vectors
until it finds an i such that p← xi + x′i and q ← yi + y′i are
distinct primes and gcd(p−1, q−1, e) = 1. If the device fails
to find such primes, it would abort and repeat the process.
3.3 DSA Key Generation
The DSA key generation protocol, which we present in
Figure 3, takes place between a device and the entropy au-
thority.
Parameters. We assume that, before the start of the
protocol, participants have agreed upon an order-Q group
G used in the DSA signing process. If the device uses the
elliptic-curve variant of DSA (EC-DSA), then the group G
will be an elliptic curve group selected, for example, from
one of the NIST standard curves [29]. Participants must
also agree upon two public generators, g and h, of the group
G such that no one knows the discrete logarithm logg h.
While we expect most new devices to primarily use EC-
DSA keys, even new devices may also need to generate
finite-field DSA keys for interoperability with legacy devices.
When using the finite-field variant of DSA, the device may
have to generate the parameters of the finite-field DSA group
(a prime modulus p, a group order Q, and a generator g)
in addition to its keypair. To do this, the device and en-
tropy authority could agree on a domain parameter seed us-
ing a coin-flipping protocol [3] and then use this shared seed
to generate DSA parameters using the verifiable generation
method specified in the Digital Signature standard [29, Ap-
pendix A].
Protocol Description. To begin the key generation pro-
cess depicted in Figure 3, the device picks a random value
x ∈ ZQ and generates a randomized commitment to x. In
the event that the device has a strong entropy source, the
use of a randomized commitment prevents the entropy au-
thority from learning the device’s secret x. The device sends
this commitment to the entropy authority.
Upon receiving the device’s commitment, the entropy au-
thority chooses a random value x′ ∈ ZQ and returns this
value to the device. The device sets its private key a← x+x′
mod Q and sets its public key to A ← ga. The device then
sends its public key A along with a non-interactive proof of
correctness π to the entropy authority.
The entropy authority verifies the proof π, which con-
vinces the entropy authority that A is equal to gx+x
′
. The
entropy authority then signs the device’s public key A and
returns it to the device.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section presents proofs that the RSA and DSA key
generation protocols satisfy the security properties described
in Section 2.
4.1 RSA Protocol
4.1.1 Protects Device from a Malicious EA
We first show that when the device has a strong entropy
source, a malicious EA learns no useful information about
the device’s resulting RSA secret key.
First, let us define a standalone RSA modulus genera-
tion algorithm which does not interact with an EA. The key
generator takes as input a security parameter k and lower
bounds pmin and qmin on the RSA primes p and q.
PrimeGen(k, pmin):
choose a random x in [2k, 2k+1]
find the smallest prime p s.t. p ≥ pmin + x
and s.t. gcd(p− 1, e) = 1
output p
RSAKeyGen(k, pmin, qmin):
p← PrimeGen(k, pmin) , q ← PrimeGen(k, qmin)
output n← p · q
We say that a modulus generator outputs a secure dis-
tribution of RSA moduli n if the resulting family of RSA
Device Entropy Authority
Step 1
choose x, r
R←− ZQ
Cx ← Commit(x; r)
send Cx
✲ Step 2
choose x′
R←− ZQ
send x′
✛Step 3
a← x+ x′ mod Q
A← ga
π ← PedProve(x, r,Cx, x′, A)
send A,π
✲ Step 4
abort if
PedVer(π,Cx, x
′, A) 6= 1
σ ← SignEA(A)
send σ
✛Step 5
abort if VerifyEA(σ, A) 6= 1
public key is 〈A, σ〉
Figure 3: DSA Key Generation Protocol
functions x → xe mod n is a family of trapdoor one-way
functions (where e is the RSA encryption exponent, a small
prime constant). A secure modulus generator is sufficient for
use in standard RSA encryption and RSA signature systems.
We use the following RSA assumption about algorithm
RSAKeyGen above: algorithm RSAKeyGen(k, pmin, qmin) out-
puts a secure distribution of RSA moduli for all pmin and
qmin in the interval [2
k, 2k+1).
The following theorem shows that even when interacting
with a malicious EA, the RSA key generation protocol in
Figure 2 outputs a secure distribution of RSA moduli. Fur-
thermore, the protocol leaks at most O(log k) bits of infor-
mation about the prime factors to the EA. This small leak
does not harm security since if it were possible to invert the
RSA function given the few leaked bits then it would also
be possible to do it without, simply by trying all possible
values for the leaked bits in time polynomial in 2log k = k.
Moreover, if desired this small leak can be eliminated at the
cost of more computation, as explained in Section 3.2.2.
Theorem 1. Suppose the device has a strong entropy source
(i.e., the device can repeatedly sample independent uniform
bits in {0, 1}). Then for all EA, the protocol in Figure 2
generates a secure distribution of RSA moduli assuming the
RSA assumption above. Furthermore, EA’s view of the pro-
tocol can be simulated with at most O(log k) advice bits with
high probability.
Proof. Let A be a malicious EA that, given random com-
mitments Cx, Cy, outputs (x
′, y′)← A(Cx, Cy). Then, since
Pedersen commitments are information theoretically hiding,
the protocol in Figure 2 outputs a modulus n sampled from
the following distribution:
choose random Cx, Cy
R←− ZQ
(pmin, qmin)← A(Cx, Cy)
output RSAKeyGen(k, pmin, qmin)
Therefore, by the RSA assumption about algorithm RSAKeyGen
the protocol generates a secure distribution of RSA moduli.
Next, to argue that the protocol leaks at most O(log k)
bits of information about the prime factors with high prob-
ability, we construct a simulator S that simulates the tran-
script of a successful run of the protocol with A = 〈A1,A2〉
given only n and an additional O(log k) bits of information.
This will prove that given n, the protocol leaks only O(log k)
additional bits. The protocol transcript consists of
〈Cx, Cy , x′, y′, n, δx, δy, π, σ〉
where n = pq and p = x+ x′+ δx, q = y+ y
′+ δy for some
x, y. For a prime p let pre(p) be the prime immediately
preceding p, such that pre(p) − 1 is relatively prime to the
RSA encryption exponent e. The simulator S takes three
arguments as input: the modulus n = pq produced by a
successful run of the protocol and the quantities
∆p = min(p− pre(p), ∆) ; ∆q = min(q − pre(q), ∆)
The simulator works as follows:
S(n,∆p,∆q):
repeat:
set Cx, Cy
R←− ZQ
set (x′, y′)← A1(Cx, Cy)
until n ∈ [(x′ + 2k)(y′ + 2k), (x′ + 2k+1)(y′ + 2k+1) )
set δx
R←− [0,∆p), δy R←− [0,∆q)
use the NIZK simulator to simulate a proof π
that n = (x+ x′ + δx)(y + y
′ + δy)
where x and y are the values committed in Cx, Cy
set σ ← A2(n, δx, δy , π)
output the simulated transcript:
〈Cx, Cy, x′, y′, n, δx, δy , π, σ〉
The simulator S properly simulates the Pedersen commit-
ments Cx, Cy and the quantities x
′, y′, given that the proto-
col generated the modulus n. Similarly, given that n = pq
was the output we know that the random variable x + x′
is uniformly distributed in the interval (pre(p), p] whenever
p − pre(p) < ∆ and is uniform in (p −∆, p] otherwise. Ei-
ther way, the value of δx is uniform in [0,∆p). Hence S
properly simulates δx and similarly δy. Finally, π is prop-
erly simulated using the ZK knowledge simulator for a proof
of Pedersen products.
We explained in Section 3.2 that ∆p and ∆q are O(k) in
size, and therefore the protocol leaks at most O(log k) bits
of information
An important technical point is that a malicious entropy
authority could send an invalid signature σ in the last step
of the protocol, which would cause the device to abort the
protocol. If the entropy authority allows the protocol to
complete with only negligible probability, then the simulator
will have to rewind the entropy authority a super-polynomial
number of times, and the simulator will not necessarily suc-
ceed in polynomial time.
If an entropy authority only allows the protocol to com-
plete with negligible probability, however, a device will only
be able to generate a key using one such entropy authority
with negligible probability. Thus a device is extremely un-
likely to ever use such a key in practice. Against adversaries
that do allow the protocol to complete with non-negligible
probability, the simulator will always run in expected poly-
nomial time.
4.1.2 Protects Device from the CA and Client
Having established that the protocol protects a high-entropy
device from the entropy authority, we demonstrate that an
honest device interacting with an honest entropy authority
holds a strong key at the end of a protocol run, even if the
device has a weak entropy source.
Theorem 2. When interacting with an honest EA, the RSA
protocol in Figure 2 generates a secure distribution of RSA
moduli, assuming that algorithm RSAKeyGen outputs a se-
cure distribution of RSA moduli.
Proof. Let A be a device honestly following the protocol,
but one that may have a weak entropy source. We let A()
denote the x, y chosen by the device in Step 1. Given an
honest EA, the protocol in Figure 2 outputs a modulus n
sampled from the following distribution:
(pmin, qmin)← A()
output RSAKeyGen(k, pmin, qmin)
By the RSA assumption about algorithm RSAKeyGen the
protocol generates secure RSA moduli.
4.1.3 Protects EA from a Malicious Device
Suppose the device is dishonest and its goal is to discredit
the entropy authority. The device may try to cause the EA
to sign a modulus n in Step 4 of the protocol, such that n
is sampled from a low-entropy distribution. For example,
one of the prime factors of n = pq may look non-random
(e.g. its binary representation may end in many 1’s), or
n may have a non-trivial GCD with another public RSA
modulus, or the two prime factors p and q may not be sam-
pled independently, say q = p + 2. If the factors p and q
become public then the EA’s signature would serve as in-
criminating evidence that the “random” values x′ and y′ the
EA contributed to the protocol in Step 2 were not sampled
independently from the uniform distribution over [2k, 2k+1).
If the modulus n output by the device is an ill-formed RSA
modulus, say n is not a product of two primes or the primes
are not in [2k+1, 2k+2) then clearly the EA is not at fault
since the device did not properly generate n. Therefore the
EA need not worry about invalid moduli—it should only
care about not signing moduli sampled from low-entropy
distributions.
We argue in Theorem 3 below that an honest EA will never
sign a modulus sampled from a low-entropy distribution even
when interacting with a malicious device. The desire to
protect the EA from a malicious device explains why we need
a protocol such as the protocol of Figure 2. If this property
is not needed then a far simpler protocol is sufficient: the
EA can simply send a random string to the device. The
device will generate a modulus n incorporating the entropy
from the EA and send the resulting modulus back to the EA
for signing. The problem is that in this trivial protocol the
EA blindly signs the modulus without any guarantees that
the modulus incorporates the EA’s randomness. Indeed, a
dishonest device could easily get the EA to sign a modulus
n = pq where the primes p and q are selected from a low-
entropy distribution, say where p = q + 2. The dishonest
device could then claim that the EA provided faulty entropy
and thereby discredit the EA.
Theorem 3 below shows that no malicious device can dis-
credit the EA when the protocol in Figure 2 is used. In
particular, we show that a modulus n signed by the EA in
Step 4 is sampled from a distribution with min-entropy of at
least 2k−polylog(k) bits. Since we assume n is well formed,
the primes p and q must lie in the interval [2k+1, 2k+2) and
therefore each prime must be chosen from a distribution with
independent min-entropy of about k bits (otherwise n can-
not have min-entropy of around 2k bits).
Theorem 3. Consider an honest entropy authority inter-
acting with a malicious polynomial-time device using the
protocol in Figure 2. Let n be a modulus signed by an honest
entropy authority in Step 4. If n = pq, where p and q are
primes in [2k+1, 2k+2), and the prime order Q of the group
used for Pedersen commitments satisfies Q > 24k+8, then n
is sampled from a distribution with at least 2k− c log(k) bits
of min-entropy for some absolute constant c.
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on a number theoretic state-
ment about the number of small solutions to a particular
modular equation. We first state the lemma and then prove
Theorem 3.
Lemma 4. For all sufficiently large k, all primes Q >
24k+8, all x, y ∈ ZQ, and all n ∈ [22k+2, 22k+4) that are
a product of two primes:
the number of x′, y′ ∈ [2k, 2k+1) such that
n ≡ (x+ x′)(y + y′) (mod Q)
is bounded by kd for some absolute constant d.
We prove Lemma 4 in Appendix A.
In our protocol, the device has control over the values δx
and δy . These values must fall in the range [0,∆), where
∆ has size linear in k, so the values x′ and y′ in Lemma 4
range over [2k, 2k+1+wk) for some absolute constant w. We
note that if Lemma 4 holds over the interval [2k, 2k+1), it
must also hold over this wider interval because the number
of additional solutions in the wider interval cannot be larger
than 2wk. Thus, the total number of solutions in the wider
interval is still bounded by a polynomial in k.
Proof of Theorem 3. In Step 4 of the protocol, the proof π
convinces the EA that
n = (x+ x′ + δx)(y + y
′ + δy) (mod Q)
for some (unknown) x and y, where Q is the group order
used for the Pedersen commitments. Recall that Q > 24k+8.
Since the device must commit to x before seeing x′ we know
that p0 = x + x
′ is sampled from a distribution over ZQ
with min-entropy at least k (in the worst case, x + x′ is
sampled uniformly from the integers in an interval of width
2k). Similarly the min-entropy of q0 = y + y
′ is at least
k even when conditioned on p0. Therefore, the probability
that (p0, q0) is equal to a particular pair in ZQ is at most
1/22k .
Now, by Lemma 4, for all RSA moduli n in the interval
[22k+2, 22k+4), the probability that p0q0 = n mod Q is at
most kd/22k . Since the density of RSA moduli in this inter-
val is about 1/k2, conditioning on n being an RSA modulus
increases the probability that p0q0 = n mod Q to at most
kd+2/22k . Therefore the min-entropy of the random variable
p0q0 conditioned on p0q0 being an RSA modulus is at least
2k− (d+2) log k. Since the malicious device controls δx and
δy and 0 ≤ δx, δy < ∆ the device can increase the probabil-
ity of a particular n by at most a factor of ∆2. Therefore,
assuming ∆ < wk for some absolute constant w, the prob-
ability that a successful protocol run produces a particular
RSA modulus is at most kd+4w2/22k. We obtain that the
min-entropy of the random variable (x+x′+δx)(y+y
′+δy)
(mod Q), conditioned on this quantity being an RSA mod-
ulus, is at least 2k − (d+ 4) log k − 2 logw, as required.
We note that Lemma 4 would not be needed to prove
Theorem 3 if in the message following Step 1 (Figure 2) the
device proved to the EA in zero-knowledge that x and y
are in the interval [2k, 2k+1) using a zero-knowledge range
proof [4, 5]. The reason is that if x and y are bound to the
relatively short interval [2k, 2k+1) then Lemma 4 is trivial
to prove. By relying on Lemma 4, which holds for all x and
y in ZQ, we avoid the need for zero-knowledge range proofs,
making our protocol considerably more efficient.
Smaller Values of Q. While we proved Lemma 4 (and
thus Theorem 3) for Q > 24k+8, we conjecture that Theo-
rem 3 holds for smaller values of Q and in particular when
Q > 22k+100 as suggested in Section 3.2. This improves effi-
ciency of the protocol since Pedersen commitments are more
efficient with a smaller Q.
The reason that security likely holds for a smaller Q is that
that a considerably weaker version of Lemma 4 is sufficient
to prove the security of our protocol. To see why, observe
that the x, y ∈ ZQ chosen by device must be such that for
random x′ and y′ in [2k, 2k+1) the resulting modulus n is in
the correct range with non-negligible probability. The set of
such x and y is quite limited and it suffices that Lemma 4
hold only for such x and y which is a considerably smaller set
than all of ZQ. Clearly, this restriction on x and y is satisfied
if x and y are in the range [2k, 2k+1). However, a malicious
device can choose x and y differently. For example the device
can choose x in [2k, 2k+1) and y in [Q/2 + 2k, Q/2 + 2k+1].
In this case the resulting n will be in the correct range with
probability 1/2, namely whenever x+ x′+ δx is even. Since
the device is restricted to choosing such special x, y ∈ ZQ
(i.e. x and y such that for random x′ and y′ in [2k, 2k+1) the
resulting modulus n is in [22k+2, 22k+4) with non-negligible
probability), we only need Lemma 4 to hold for such x and y.
Optimization for Large Q. An implementation that
needs to use the provable bound on Q from Theorem 3 will
need to use a group G for the Pedersen commitments and
product proofs which has order Q ≈ 24k+8, compared with
the Q ≈ 22k+100 used in Section 3.2. To reduce the overhead
of using this larger group size, an implementation could use
a group G whose order Q is a product of two large primes
each of size about 22k+4. This group G then is a direct
product of two smaller groups G1 and G2 each of size about
22k+4. In the appendix, we prove that Lemma 4 holds for
such composite Q and therefore, Theorem 3 continues to
hold for such groups G.
When G is a direct product of G1 and G2 an implemen-
tation can uniquely describe an element x ∈ G as a tuple
〈x1 ∈ G1, x2 ∈ G2〉. The implementation can then per-
form the commitments and product proofs over these re-
duced elements (once in G1 and once in G2) in groups of
order m1 ≈ m2 ≈ 22k+4. By representing group elements
in this way, the implementation benefits from the provable
bounds in Theorem 3, but group exponentiations in this
larger group take only twice as long as group operations
take in the smaller group we use in Section 3.2. In contrast,
the na¨ıve method of using a group of prime order Q ≈ 24k+8
would cause group exponentiations to take four times as
long in the larger group than the same operations take in
the smaller group. Since a number of the protocol opera-
tions (e.g., finding the δ values) take time independent of
the size of the group used for commitments, we expect that
performing commitments in this larger group would only
cause a 1.5× overall slowdown.
4.2 DSA Protocol
In this section, we prove that the DSA key generation pro-
tocol satisfies the security properties outlined in Section 2.
4.2.1 Protects Device from a Malicious EA
We first prove that a device with a strong entropy source
leaks no information about its secret key to the entropy au-
thority during a run of the protocol.
Theorem 5. If the device has a strong entropy source (i.e.,
the device can sample repeatedly from the uniform distribu-
tion over ZQ), then the entropy authority can simulate its
interaction with the device.
Proof. We construct a simulator S that, given a DSA pub-
lic key A = ga, outputs the transcript 〈Cx, x′, A, π, σ〉 of a
protocol run between an honest device and a malicious en-
tropy authority 〈A1,A2〉. The simulator S constructs the
transcript as follows:
S(A): set Cx
R←− G
set x′ ← A1(Cx)
generate π using the NIZK simulator
set σ ← A2(A,π)
if σ is invalid, rewind the adversary and repeat;
otherwise, output the simulated transcript:
〈Cx, x′, A, π, σ〉
This simulated transcript is indistinguishable from the
transcript an EA would generate during an interaction with
an honest device with a strong entropy source. The value
Cx will be a random element from G in both cases, the
value x′ will be chosen by the adversary in both cases, the
NIZK will be simulable in the random oracle model [2] by
the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK, and the signature
is constructed identically in either case.
As explained at the end of the proof of Theorem 1, we can
assume that the entropy authority allows an honest execu-
tion of the protocol to succeed with non-negligible probabil-
ity and thus, the simulator runs in time polynomial in the
security parameter.
4.2.2 Protects Device from the CA and Client
Having established that a device with a strong entropy
source leaks no secret information to the entropy authority,
we now demonstrate that the secret key produced by the
protocol is sampled from the uniform distribution over the
set of possible keys, even if the entropy authority is dishon-
est.
Theorem 6. The secret key produced by a successful run
of the protocol in Figure 3 between an honest device (with
a strong entropy source) and a malicious entropy authority,
will be sampled independently from the uniform distribution
over ZQ.
Proof. Given that the device is honest and has a strong en-
tropy source, the device will sample the commitment ran-
domness r from the uniform distribution over ZQ. Thus,
the commitment Cx will be independent of the device’s se-
cret value x. The entropy authority must send its random
value x′ to the device given only this commitment Cx, so
no matter how the entropy authority selects x′, it must be
independent of x. The honest device forms its secret key
as a = x + x′ mod Q, and since x is independent of x′, the
secret key a will be sampled from the uniform distribution
over ZQ.
4.2.3 Protects EA from a Malicious Device
Finally, we show that an honest entropy authority with
a strong entropy source will only sign public keys whose
corresponding private keys are sampled from the uniform
distribution over ZQ.
Theorem 7. The secret key produced by a successful run of
the protocol in Figure 3 between an honest entropy author-
ity (with a strong entropy source) and a malicious device,
will be sampled independently from the uniform distribution
over ZQ.
Proof. Since the device must commit to x before it sees x′,
x must be independent of x′. If the device could pick x to
depend on the authority’s value x′, the device would violate
the binding property of the commitment scheme.
The honest entropy authority will only sign the public key
A if the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π the device
sends in Step 3 is valid and the entropy authority will only
accept the proof π if A = gx+x
′
. The hypothesis of the theo-
rem is that the entropy authority is honest and has a strong
source of entropy, so the entropy authority will sample x′
uniformly from ZQ. Since x
′ is independent of x, the secret
key a = x+ x′ mod Q is uniform over ZQ.
5. EVALUATION
To demonstrate the practicality of our RSA and DSA key
generation protocols, we implemented the protocols in C us-
ing the OpenSSL cryptography library. We evaluated the
performance of the protocols on three different devices: a
Linux workstation with two 3.2 GHz Intel W3656 proces-
sors, a MacBook Pro laptop with a single 2.5 GHz dual-
core processor, and a Linksys E2500-NP home router with
a 300 MHz Broadcom BCM5357r2 processor. The entropy
authority in all experiments was a modern Linux server and
the DSA protocol experiments use the NIST P-224 ellip-
tic curve as the elliptic curve DSA (EC-DSA) group [29].
The source code of our implementation is available online at
http://github.com/henrycg/earand.
Embedded devices, like the Linksys router we used in our
evaluations, lack the keyboard, mouse, hard drive, and other
peripherals used as entropy sources on full-fledged machines.
As a result, these device are particularly susceptible to gen-
erating weak keys. By evaluating our key generation proto-
cols on a $70 Linksys router, we demonstrate that the pro-
tocols are practical even on low-power, low-cost (and often
EC-DSA (224-bit prime) RSA (2048-bit)
No proto Proto Proto+Net Slowdown No proto Proto Proto+Net Slowdown
Linksys Router 0.35 0.98 1.54 4.4× 50.54 93.78 104.47 2.1×
Laptop 0.014 0.085 0.646 48× 0.41 1.18 2.05 5.0×
Workstation 0.003 0.052 0.638 200× 0.15 0.65 1.22 8.3×
Table 1: Time (in seconds) to generate a keypair without our protocol, with a local EA, and with an EA
via the Internet with ≈ 100 ms of round-trip latency. The Slowdown column indicates the rounded slowdown
factor of our protocol running over the Internet relative to the standard key generation algorithm.
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Figure 4: Operations taking longer than 0.05s dur-
ing a run of the RSA protocol on the home router.
low-entropy) embedded devices. For the purposes of eval-
uation, we installed the Linux-based dd-wrt [26] operating
system on the Linksys router and ran our key generation
protocol in a user-space Linux process.
Table 1 presents the wall-clock time required to generate
a 2048-bit RSA key and a 224-bit EC-DSA key on each
machine, averaged over eight trial runs. When running on
the laptop and workstation, which have relatively fast CPUs,
the bulk of the protocol overhead comes from the network
latency in communicating with the entropy authority. On
the CPU-limited home router, the RSA protocol causes a
near-2× slowdown. Running the EC-DSA protocol takes
fewer than two seconds on all three of the devices.
The standard RSA keypair generation algorithm requires
much more computation than the EC-DSA algorithm, so the
cost of interacting with the entropy authority is amortized
over a longer total computation in the RSA protocol. As
a result, the slowdown factors on each of the three devices
is smaller for the RSA protocol than for the DSA variant.
The protocol incurs a 2.1× slowdown when running on the
home router—generating a standard 2048-bit RSA keypair
takes roughly 50 seconds and generating a keypair with the
protocol takes just over 104 seconds. On the laptop and
workstation, around 50% of the slowdown is due to network
latency. On these faster devices, generating an RSA keypair
using the protocol takes less than three seconds.
Figure 4 presents a graphical break-down of the CPU user
time required to perform the most expensive operations in
the RSA key generation protocol on the home router. Nearly
half of the CPU time consumed during the protocol is spent
in finding the δx and δy offset values to make the RSA fac-
tors p and q prime. Finding these offsets requires running
the Miller-Rabin [42] primality test on a number of candi-
date primes. This expensive search for primes p and q is also
required to generate an RSA modulus without our key gen-
eration protocol, so this search does not constitute protocol
overhead.
The other expensive operations are computing the Peder-
sen commitments (each of which requires big-integer modu-
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Figure 5: Computational overhead (in CPU user
time) imposed when a laptop uses our key gener-
ation protocols to generate keypairs of various sizes,
averaged over 32 trials.
lar exponentiations) and generating the non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof that n is the product of the values contained
in the commitments Cp and Cq . The final expensive oper-
ation is generating the PKCS#10 certificate request, which
the device signs with its newly generated RSA key.
Our implementation does not use fast multi-exponentiation
algorithms [38] (e.g., for computing Pedersen commitments
gahr quickly) or exploit parallelism to increase performance
on multi-core machines. An aggressively optimized production-
ready implementation could use these techniques to improve
the performance of the protocol.
As shown in Figure 5, our protocol imposes a near-uniform
6× computational overhead (measured in CPU user time) on
EC-DSA key generation. This slowdown arises because our
EC-DSA protocol requires five elliptic curve point multipli-
cations and a single signature verification, compared with
the single elliptic curve point multiplication required in tra-
ditional EC-DSA key generation. At the smallest usable
EC-DSA key size, 112 bits, the protocol set-up cost dom-
inates the overall running time, so the protocol imposes a
near-9× overhead.
The computational overhead of generating RSA keys using
our protocol decreases as the key size increases. The domi-
nant additional cost of our RSA protocol is the cost of the
modular exponentiations used in the commitment scheme
and zero-knowledge proof generation. As k increases, the
cost of finding the RSA primes grows faster than the addi-
tional cost of our protocol, so the computational overhead
of our protocol tends to 1.
6. IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS
This section discusses a handful of practical implementa-
tion issues that a real-world deployment of our key genera-
tion protocols would have to address.
Integration with the CA infrastructure. Integrating
our key generation protocols with the existing CA infras-
tructure would require only modest modifications to today’s
infrastructure. In a deployment of our key generation pro-
tocol, the device could interact with the entropy authority
using an HTTP API. After the device obtains the entropy
authority’s signature on its public key, the device would em-
bed the EA signature in an extension field in the PKCS#10
certificate signing request that the device sends to the cer-
tificate authority. Each certificate authority would maintain
a list of public keys of approved entropy authorities (in the
way that browsers and SSL libraries today maintain a list of
root CA public keys). When a certificate authority receives
a PKCS#10 request from a device, the CA would first check
the validity of the EA’s signature on the request. If the sig-
nature is valid and the CA is able to verify the identity of
the requesting device, the CA would sign the certificate and
return it to the device.
We expect that many commercial certificate authorities
would be willing to serve as free public entropy authorities,
since the computational cost of acting as an entropy author-
ity is small (less than one CPU-second per protocol run).
Organizations large enough to have their own IT depart-
ments might run their own internal entropy authorities as
well.
Self-Signed Certificates and SSH. TLS servers often
use self-signed certificates to provide link encryption with-
out CA-certified identity. The analogue of a self-signed cer-
tificate in our setting is a certificate that is signed by the
entropy authority but that is not signed by a certificate au-
thority. This sort of certificate would convince a third party
that the device’s public key is sampled from a high-entropy
distribution, without convincing a third party that the key
corresponds to a particular real-world identity. As long as
some EAs provide their services for free (which we expect),
EA-signed certificates will be free, just as self-signed certifi-
cates are free today.
To generate such a certificate, the device would submit
a PKCS#10 certificate signing request to the entropy au-
thority at the end of Step 3 of the RSA protocol or Step 3
of the DSA protocol, along with other data it sends. The
entropy authority would then sign the request and would
return the EA-signed certificate to the device. TLS clients
(e.g., Web browsers) would maintain a list of public keys
of approved entropy authorities, just as today’s client keep
a list of approved root CAs. When a client connects to a
device that uses an EA-signed certificate, the client would
verify the EA’s signature and would treat the certificate just
as it treats self-signed certificates today.
SSH could similarly use EA-signed keys to use convince
clients that a particular SSH host generated its public key
using random values from an approved entropy authority.
To accomplish this, the SSH server software would define
a new public key algorithm type for EA-signed keys (e.g.,
ssh-rsa-rand). Keys of this type would contain the SSH
host’s normal public key, but they would also contain an
EA’s signature on the SSH host’s public key (along with
the fingerprint of the signing EA’s key). SSH clients that
support the ssh-rsa-rand key type would be able to verify
the EA’s signature on the host’s key to confirm that that
the host’s key incorporates randomness from an approved
entropy authority.
Other entropy issues. Our key generation protocol
only ensures that a device’s RSA or DSA keypair has suffi-
cient randomness—it does not ensure randomness in other
security-critical parts of the system (e.g., signing nonce gen-
eration, TLS session key selection, address space layout ran-
domization). We focus on cryptographic key generation be-
cause attacks against weak public keys are especially easy to
mount. Once a device publishes a weak public key, the de-
vice is likely to use the same public key for months or years.
Thus, even if the device’s entropy source strengthens over
time (as the device gathers randomness from network inter-
rupt timings, for example) the device’s keys remains weak.
Hedged public-key cryptography [1, 43], in conjunction with
our key generation protocols, would help reduce the risk of
bad randomness in signing and encryption, but solving all
of these randomness problems is likely beyond the scope of
any single system.
Distributing trust with many entropy authorities.
As we note in Section 2, if the device has a weak entropy
source then there is no way to protect the device against an
eavesdropper that observes all communication between the
device and the EA. Our threat model excludes the possibil-
ity of such an eavesdropper, but if the device is particularly
concerned about eavesdroppers on its initial conversation
with the EA, the device could run a modified version of the
protocol with many entropy authorities instead of just one.
With multiple EAs, an eavesdropper would have to observe
the device’s communication with all of the EAs to learn the
device’s secret key. Informally, if an adversary controls all
but one of the entropy authorities (call this entropy author-
ity the “honest” one) and if the adversary can eavesdrop on
the device’s communication with all entropy authorities ex-
cept the honest one, then a private key a generated using
a multi-authority key-generation protocol will still be sam-
pled from the uniform distribution, even when conditioned
on the adversary’s knowledge.
We sketch the multi-authority DSA protocol here. A simi-
lar modification allows RSA key generation with multiple en-
tropy authorities. In the following protocol, each entity has a
well-known long-term signature verification public key and
every message sent between participants includes a public
per-session nonce and is signed with the sender’s long-term
public key. The multi-authority DSA protocol proceeds as
follows:
• The device commits to its random x using random-
ness r and sends C ← Commit(x; r) to each of the N
entropy authorities.
• Each entropy authority i selects random values xi and
ri, generates a commitment Ci ← Commit(xi; ri), pro-
duces a signature σi on 〈i, C,Ci〉 and returns 〈xi, ri, σi〉
to the device.
• The device sets A = gx+Σixi and produces a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
PoK{x, x1, . . . , xN , r1, . . . , rN :
C = gxhr ∧ (∧iCi = gxihri) ∧A = gx+Σixi}
incorporating the randomness provided by the entropy
authorities into the secrets it uses to generate the non-
interactive proof. The device sends
〈A,PoK, C1, . . . , CN , σ1, . . . , σN 〉
to each entropy authority.
• Each entropy authority i checks each signature σj , ver-
ifies the zero-knowledge proof, signs the device’s public
key A, and returns its signature on the public key to
the device.
Without loss of generality, assume that entropy authority
1 is the honest one. Since we assume that the adversary can-
not eavesdrop on the device’s communication with entropy
authority 1, the adversary will never learn x1 and it will
only learn C1 after it has had to pick C2, . . . , CN . Thus, the
adversary’s commitments must be independent of C1 and
its values x2, . . . , xN must be independent of x1. Since the
device generates the proof of knowledge using randomness
derived from the randomness sent by each entropy authority
(including entropy authority 1), the proof of knowledge will
not leak any information about the device’s secrets. The de-
vice’s private key a = x+Σixi mod Q will then be sampled
from the uniform distribution over ZQ, even conditioned on
the adversary’s knowledge.
Default keys. Roughly 5% of TLS hosts on the Inter-
net in 2012 used default keys, which are pre-loaded into the
device’s firmware by the manufacturer [33]. Typically, any
two such devices of the same model and firmware version
will ship with the same public and secret key. To recover
a default secret key, an attacker can download the firmware
for the device from the manufacturer’s Web site or look up
the default key in a database designed for that purpose [37].
Our protocol does not protect against a manufacturer who
installs the same keypair in many devices. If a manufacturer
wants all of her devices to ship with a default keypair signed
by an entropy authority, the manufacturer could run our key
generation protocol once in the factory, and then install this
single EA-signed keypair in every device shipped.
Installing the same keypair in many devices is tantamount
to publishing the device’s secret key, which is an “attack”
which we cannot hope to prevent. As a heuristic defense
against default keys, a client connecting to a device could
require that the device use a certificate that was generated
after the manufacture of the device (as indicated, for exam-
ple, by an EA-signed timestamp on the certificate).
7. RELATED WORK
Hedged public-key cryptography [1, 43] addresses the prob-
lem of weak randomness during message signing or encryp-
tion, whereas our work addresses the problem of random-
ness during key generation. Cryptographic hedging provides
no protection against randomness failures when generating
cryptographic keys but deployed systems could use hedg-
ing in conjunction with our key-generation protocols to de-
fend against weak randomness after generating their cryp-
tographic keys.
Intel’s Ivy Bridge processor implements a hardware in-
struction that exploits physical uncertainty in a dedicated
circuit to gather random numbers [44]. A hardware ran-
dom number generator provides a new and potentially rich
source of entropy to cryptographic applications. Devices
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Figure 6: Approximate number of k-bit modular ex-
ponentiations the device must compute to generate
a k-bit RSA modulus.
without hardware random number generators could use a
variety of other techniques to gather possibly unpredictable
values early in the system boot process [39]. Even so, having
a rich entropy source does not mean that software develop-
ers will properly incorporate the entropy into cryptographic
secrets. Our protocol ensures that keys will have high en-
tropy, even if the cryptographic software ignores or misuses
hardware-supplied randomness.
Juels and Guajardo [34] offer a protocol for RSA key gen-
eration that is superficially similar to the one we present
here. The Juels-Guajardo protocol protects against klep-
tography [46], in which a device’s cryptography library is
adversarial, and repudiation, in which a signer intention-
ally generates a weak cryptographic signing key so that the
signer can disown signed messages in the future. To pre-
vent against these very strong adversaries, their protocol
requires a number of additional zero-knowledge proofs that
are unnecessary in our model. Using the number of modular
exponentiations as a proxy for protocol execution time, the
Juels-Guajardo protocol would likely take over 40 minutes
to execute on the home router we used in our experiments,
while our protocol takes fewer than two minutes (see Fig-
ure 6). In addition, Juels and Guajardo do not address the
issue of a device whose source of randomness is so weak that
it cannot create blinding commitments or establish a secure
SSL session.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a systemic solution to the problem
of low-entropy keys. We present a new threat model, in
which a device generating cryptographic secrets may have
one communication session with an entropy authority which
an eavesdropper cannot observe. Under this threat model,
we describe protocols for generating RSA and DSA keypairs
that do not weaken keys for devices that have a strong en-
tropy source, but that can considerably strengthen keys gen-
erated on low-entropy devices. Our key generation protocols
incur tolerable slow-downs, even on a CPU-limited home
router. The threat model and protocols presented herein
offer a promising solution to the long-standing problem of
weak cryptographic keys.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We prove Lemma 4 using a technique from Cilleruelo and
Garaev [8, Proof of Theorem 1]. First we state the following
simple fact. In what follows, the quantity x mod m refers to
an integer |y| < m/2 such that x = y (mod m). We will use
this fact where the scalar c (below) is some small constant
such as c = 1 or c = 2.
Fact 8. For all integers m > 2, c > 0, and a, b ∈ Z there
exists a non-zero integer t such that |t| < m1/2/c2 and
|at mod m| < cm3/4, |bt mod m| < cm3/4 .
Proof. Consider the integer lattice spanned by three vectors
u1 = (c
3m1/4, a, b), u2 = (0,m, 0) and u3 = (0, 0,m).
Its determinant is c3m2.25 and therefore, by Minkowski’s
theorem, this lattice must contain a non-zero point u whose
ℓ∞ norm is less than cm
3/4. The required integer t is the
multiplier of u1 in the integer linear combination used to
form u from the three basis vectors. This t must be non-
zero because u is non-zero.
Next we prove Lemma 4. We rename the variables for
clarity and allow the modulus m (called Q in Lemma 4) to
be either prime or a composite with no small prime factors.
We slightly generalize the lemma and note that in Lemma 4
we fixed c = 1, but here we allow c to be arbitrary. The
optimization at the end of Section 4.1.3 will use c = 2 and a
modulus m whose prime factors are all greater than
√
m/4.
Lemma. For c > 0 let m be a positive integer whose small-
est prime factor is greater than
√
m/c2. Then for all con-
stants a, b ∈ Zm, and all non-zero |n| < m1/2 such that n is
a product of at most two primes:
the number of solutions x, y to the equation
n = (x+ a)(y + b) (mod m) (1)
with |x|, |y| < m1/4/2 is at most polynomial in c logm.
Proof. First, we can assume that one of a or b is non-zero
since otherwise (1) clearly only has a constant number of
small solutions. From Fact 8 we find a non-zero integer
|t| < m1/2/c2 such that the integers u = ta mod m and
v = tb mod m are both less than cm3/4 in absolute value.
By assumption on the prime factors of m we know that
gcd(t,m) = 1. It follows that one of u or v must be non-
zero, since otherwise a = b = 0.
Without loss of generality we can assume that gcd(t, u, v) =
1 since otherwise we can replace t, u, v by their values di-
vided by the gcd and ensure that gcd(t, u, v) = 1. This
only reduces the magnitude of t, u, and v and therefore
the bounds on |t|, |u|, |v| continue to hold. Moreover, since
gcd(t,m) = 1, after division by gcd(t, u, v) it still holds that
u = ta mod m and v = tb mod m.
Multiplying (1) by t, we obtain
txy + vx+ uy ≡ tn− tab (mod m) (2)
The left-hand side of this congruence satisfies:
|txy + vx+ uy| ≤ m1/2m1/4m1/4 + cm3/4m1/4 = (c+ 1)m
Therefore, setting r0 = tn − tab mod m where |r0| < m/2,
we can rewrite the congruence (2) as an equation:
txy+vx+uy = r0+zm for some integer |z| ≤ c+ 1 (3)
There are now two cases to consider:
• Case (i): |t| > m1/4/2 or |u| > m1/2/4 or |v| >
m1/2/4. In this case, for each integer |z| ≤ c + 1 we
can apply Coppersmith’s algorithm [9] to (3) to find
small roots x and y of the polynomial. To apply Cop-
persmith’s algorithm to find the roots of a polynomial,
the coefficients of the polynomial must share no com-
mon factor and this holds since gcd(t, u, v) = 1.
Coppersmith’s algorithm finds roots x ≤ X and y ≤ Y
of a polynomial f(x, y) with degree δ in each variable
separately, when the largest coefficientW of f(Xx, Y y)
satisfies: XY < W 2/(3δ). For our purposes, we set
δ = 1, X = m1/4/2, and Y = m1/4/2 which are the
bounds on |x| and |y| in the theorem statement.
The value W then is at least:
max{tXY, vX, uY } < W
max{tm1/2/4, vm1/4/2, um1/4/2} < W
In this case we have that either |t| > m1/4/2, |u| >
m1/2/4 or |v| > m1/2/4 and therefore W > m3/4/8.
Thus, we can apply Coppersmith’s algorithm, since
XY = m1/2/4 = (m3/4/8)2/3 < W 2/3 .
Now, for each |z| ≤ c+1, since Coppersmith’s algorithm
finds all small solutions to (3) in time polynomial in
logW , and W < m, there can be at most polylog(m)
solutions to (3) as required. Since |z| < c + 1, overall
there are at most (c+ 1)polylog(m) solutions.
• Case (ii): |t| ≤ m1/4/2 and |u| ≤ m1/2/4 and |v| ≤
m1/2/4. Since m1/4/2 cannot be an integer we know
that |t| is strictly less than m1/4/2. Multiplying (2) by
t, we can write
(tx+ u)(ty + v) ≡ t2n (mod m)
In this case, both the left-hand and right-hand sides
of this equation are strictly less than m/2 in absolute
value. Therefore, the equation
(tx+ u)(ty + v) = t2n (4)
must hold over the integers.
Since by assumption one of u or v is non-zero, let us
suppose that u is the non-zero one (the case that v
is non-zero is handled identically). In this case we can
assume that gcd(t, u) = 1, since otherwise we can divide
both sides of (4) by gcd(t, u). Since gcd(t, u) = 1 we
obtain that
gcd(tx+ u, t) = gcd(t, u) = 1
and consequently the only way that (4) can hold is if
tx + u divides n. Since n is the product of at most
two primes, tx + u can only be ±1,±n, or one of the
prime factors of n (or their negatives). Overall there
can be at most eight solutions to (4) and therefore at
most eight solutions to (1).
Either way there can be at most polylog(m) solutions to (3)
as required.
